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DD/A Registry

2-5
77-30724

DD/A Registry

File Security-2

30 JUN 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT: Security of Codeword Materials (U)

REFERENCE: DCI Memo dtd 2 June 77, same subject
(ER-77-7344/2)

1. (U) Action Requested: None; for information only in response to your request for more information on the security of sensitive compartmented information (SCI), most often referred to as "codeword" material.

2. (U) Background: Pursuant to your instructions, the Office of Security checked with codeword control officers at State, ERDA, DIA, Air Force, Navy and NSA on the methods of handling codeword material internally.

(C) These inquiries developed information indicating that the procedures of handling TOP SECRET/collateral versus codeword materials are relatively uniform throughout the community. The attached substantial accounts of the comments of officers of other agencies reflect that:

a. TOP SECRET/collateral controls invariably involve more complicated record-keeping and receipting procedures.

b. There is less TOP SECRET/collateral than codeword material in all agencies queried.

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c. Codeword procedures are structured to provide an overall system for maintaining material in accredited repositories, available only to approved persons.

d. Because of the relatively larger volume of codeword material, the application of TOP SECRET/collateral receipting and inventory procedures would require considerable additional resources.

e. None of the officers queried believes that codeword procedures are being used to avoid TOP SECRET/collateral stringency. Some felt such a move could be counterproductive, in that it would preclude dissemination to those not holding codeword approvals.

f. Most of those queried thought that codeword materials are afforded a degree of security which, although achieved in a different manner, is not inferior to that provided for TOP SECRET/collateral.

g. Relatively few documents can qualify intrinsically for collateral TOP SECRET classification, as defined by E.O. 11652. Many documents, on the other hand, require compartmentation to protect sensitive aspects of technical systems for intelligence collection.

(U) The consensus of those queried appears to be that codeword material, because of its intrinsic nature, as well as its volume, is not actually in need of nor adaptable to the detailed, individualized handling afforded TOP SECRET/collateral. Thus the current situation results, not from coincidence, but from considerations of practicality, need, and the differences in two valid approaches to security.

(C) In the codeword systems, adherence to DCID 1/14 clearance criteria, despite variations in agency-by-agency applications, results in a relatively uniform "test of trustworthiness." Those granted approval for access to codeword information have all met criteria which are more uniform

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than those applied by the various heads of departments for access to TOP SECRET/collateral. All holders of access approvals for codeword information have undergone extensive background investigations. This is not necessarily true of all TOP SECRET-cleared personnel. For example, the Department of Defense grants TOP SECRET/collateral access to military personnel who have had ten years of honorable service, plus a National Agency Check. In these cases no background investigation is conducted. There is, in effect, a more rational basis for interchangeability, for acceptance by one agency of another's codeword clearance, because they result from a common, DCI-prescribed standard.

(C) In addition, the need-to-know consideration has been predetermined, in a general way, in the codeword systems. TOP SECRET has myriad applications, and the sole criterion for need-to-know is a judgment, by the holder of the information, that the recipient does, indeed, have an official need for it. While this individual need-to-know determination must still be made in the codeword systems for specific items of information, the access approval gives assurance that the holder has an official need for at least the generic category of data held in the system.

(C) There is, therefore, a far greater centralization, homogeneity and uniformity in the codeword systems than in the TOP SECRET/collateral world. The severe receipting requirements for TOP SECRET/collateral compensate, to some degree, for the lack of homogeneity. It forces a documentation of the need-to-know determination each and every time it is made. Because codeword systems deal with massive amounts of information and large numbers of people, all subject to the same clearance criteria and handling procedures, there appears to be justification for less formalized need-to-know transactions, at least with regard to individual documents. In the view of all these polled, the formalization of individual codeword document receipting would result in a serious, if not insurmountable, logjam. Nevertheless, there was unanimous agreement that there is no indication that the codeword systems are being abused by persons seeking to evade TOP SECRET/collateral procedures.

/s/ John F. Blake

John F. Blake

Attachment

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SUBJECT: Security of Codeword Materials (U)

Distribution:

Original - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
2 - DDA ~~and b~~
1 - D/Security

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ORIGINATOR:

Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security

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Date

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ATTACHMENT

Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000700020002-5

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COMMENTS BY COMMUNITY CONTROL OFFICERS
14 JUNE 1977

(C) DIA - TOP SECRET documents are receipted for each time they change hands. Codeword documents are logged out and logged in when sent from one control center to another. Neither is more important, and neither is more stringently controlled. TOP SECRET deals with document security, while codeword deals with personnel security, in that documents remain in accredited centers, accessible only by approved personnel. Codeword uses a total system for protection. TOP SECRET has no similar system, thus must rely upon receipts for accountability and control.

(C) STATE - There is a very elaborate apparatus for controlling TOP SECRET documents in the State Department, involving cover sheets, receipts each time documents are exchanged, etc. Nevertheless, TOP SECRET material is kept throughout the building with no traffic controls or other safeguards. Codeword documents are kept in controlled areas and disseminated only to authorized personnel. Codeword material probably has better security, because there is greater personnel security and need-to-know emphasis.

(C) As to using codeword controls to avoid more elaborate TS procedures, it probably doesn't happen because codeword controls limit circulation. In State Department codeword channels are used only when they can't be avoided.

(C) The two controls are based upon different criteria: TOP SECRET documents typically are classified solely on the basis of their content, and rarely does a document meet the E.O. 11652 requirements for TS classification on that basis. Codeword documents are compartmented to provide extraordinary protection to technical collection systems - the source of the document's content, not the substance.

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(C) USAF - The handling of TOP SECRET is more stringent than for codeword. We'd strangle if we had to use the same procedures for codeword - receipts at each exchange, physical inventory every six months, etc. The control procedures make it difficult to disseminate and work with the material, and probably have led to a decrease in the amount of TS material in DOD.

(C) Compartmentation procedures make codeword material comparatively easy to work with. Often, the only time TS documents come out of the safe is for the semiannual inventory. It is not likely that anyone is placing documents in codeword channels to avoid TS procedures, because the material has to be associated with the system in order to qualify for compartmentation.

(C) NAVY - There is a rigid receipting system for TOP SECRET, requiring a receipt each time a document changes hands, even though both parties may be in the same office. This is not done with SCI material, and would be impracticable because of the comparatively larger volume of material in codeword channels. The TOP SECRET system provides for accountability, in approved safes anywhere in the building, while codeword is restricted to accredited areas, populated by approved personnel. The actual security provided both types of material is about equal, but the approach is different. It is not believed that codeword channels are being used illicitly to avoid the more rigid TOP SECRET requirements.

(C) ERDA - ERDA's TOP SECRET control is probably tighter than that of most other agencies, but codeword control is just as good. There is no substantial difference in the security, afforded each, although the record-keeping for TS is more burdensome. There is not as great a disparity in the volume of TS and codeword material in ERDA as compared to DOD, for example. ERDA is taking steps to eliminate its TS holdings, and there are no TS documents remaining at the Savannah River Project. There is no evidence that anyone is deliberately using codeword channels to avoid TS procedures.

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(C) NSA - TOP SECRET documents are received constantly and are physically inventoried every six months. This probably provides more security than that afforded codeword documents, but the same couldn't be done with codeword documents because of the comparative volume of material. There is no indication that anyone is using codeword channels to avoid TOP SECRET procedures.

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REFERENCE

Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000700020002-5

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777-3119
Executive Registry
777344/2

2 JUN 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Security of Codeword Materials

1. I have read your memorandum on the security of codeword materials. I am really not persuaded that it is a coincidence that we have very few Top Secret documents under our control but many, many codeword/Secret documents.
2. Beyond that it seems inconsistent to me that we handle codeword material with less control than Top Secret. I know that this is not the case in some of the other agencies of government.
3. I would appreciate your checking with some of the principal agencies like State, ERDA, Army, Navy, Air Force, DOD, NSA and NRO, and developing a comparison of the methods of handling codeword material internally.

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CL BY [REDACTED]**CONFIDENTIAL**

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OS 72848

Executive Register
77-7344/1

DDA 77-2496

4 MAY 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration
SUBJECT: Classification
REFERENCE: Memorandum from DCI dated 25 April 1977, same subject (ER 77-7344)

1. Action Requested: None. This memorandum is submitted in response to your request for comments on the handling of Top Secret material.

2. Background: Agency procedures for handling noncompartmented Top Secret material are consistent with the requirements established by Executive Order 11652 and its implementing National Security Council Directive. It is true that the procedures for handling CODEWORD material, i.e., sensitive compartmented information, are less complex in terms of transmittal and receipting than those for Top Secret documents without compartmented controls.

In CIA the volume of noncompartmented Top Secret material represents a relatively small percentage of the total volume of classified material, therefore, no significant problems exist in adhering to the letter of Executive Order 11652 requirements.

On the other hand, CODEWORD material i.e., sensitive compartmented information, represents a large percentage of the total volume of Agency material and generally requires rapid dissemination to a large audience. Imposition of receipting requirements as strict as those that apply for noncompartmented Top Secret material would seriously inhibit such rapid dissemination.

The Office of Security has no evidence that CODEWORD designations, i.e., compartmented channels, are being used to avoid the stricter dissemination and receipting procedures of the Top Secret control system. Further, it would not appear to be a logical alternative,

since fraudulent and unnecessary application of CODEWORD control on a document would limit its dissemination within the Agency, where all staff employees hold Top Secret clearances but not all are approved for compartmented access.

The appropriate regulations governing the handling of both noncompartmented Top Secret material and CODEWORD material, i.e., sensitive compartmented information, are regularly under review. The current requirement that every reader of a Top Secret document acknowledge access by his signature is currently under review by the Agency.

We do not feel that a change in Agency or community compartmentation procedures in this area is necessary or desirable at this time.

[REDACTED] STATINTL

John F. Blake

Distribution:

Orig - addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - ER

77-7344
DD/A Registry
77-2309

25 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDA

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Classification

I understand that the procedures for handling CODEWORD material with regard to signatures, etc., are less complex than for handling TOP SECRET. Thus, many of our people use CODEWORD classification where it is not needed in order to take the easy route. Would you check on this and let me know if we should change our regulations. If so, should such a change apply to the Community as well.

[REDACTED] STATINTL

 STANSFIELD TURNER
Admiral, U.S. Navy

cc D/DCI/IC

DD/A Registry	77-3119
Executive Registry	77-7344/2

2 JUN 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
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3. I would appreciate your checking with some of the principal agencies like State, ERDA, Army, Navy, Air Force, DOD, NSA and NRO, and developing a comparison of the methods of handling codeword material internally.

[REDACTED]
d STANSFIELD TURNER

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E2-IMPDET
CL BY [REDACTED]

25X1A

77-7344
DD/A Registry
77-2309

25 APR 1977

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FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Classification

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STATINTL

STANFIELD TURNER
Admiral, U.S. Navy

cc D/DCI/IC

4 MAY 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration
SUBJECT: Classification
REFERENCE: Memorandum from DCI dated 25 April 1977, same subject (ER 77-7344)

1. Action Requested: None. This memorandum is submitted in response to your request for comments on the handling of Top Secret material.

2. Background: Agency procedures for handling noncompartmented Top Secret material are consistent with the requirements established by Executive Order 11652 and its implementing National Security Council Directive. It is true that the procedures for handling CODEWORD material, i.e., sensitive compartmented information, are less complex in terms of transmittal and receipting than those for Top Secret documents without compartmented controls.

In CIA the volume of noncompartmented Top Secret material represents a relatively small percentage of the total volume of classified material, therefore, no significant problems exist in adhering to the letter of Executive Order 11652 requirements.

On the other hand, CODEWORD material i.e., sensitive compartmented information, represents a large percentage of the total volume of Agency material and generally requires rapid dissemination to a large audience. Imposition of receipting requirements as strict as those that apply for noncompartmented Top Secret material would seriously inhibit such rapid dissemination.

The Office of Security has no evidence that CODEWORD designations, i.e., compartmented channels, are being used to avoid the stricter dissemination and receipting procedures of the Top Secret control system. Further, it would not appear to be a logical alternative,

since fraudulent and unauthorized CIA RDP80-00473A000700020002-5
control on a document would limit its dissemination within the Agency, where all staff employees hold Top Secret clearances but not all are approved for compartmented access.

The appropriate regulations governing the handling of both noncompartmented Top Secret material and CODEWORD material, i.e., sensitive compartmented information, are regularly under review. The current requirement that every reader of a Top Secret document acknowledge access by his signature is currently under review by the Agency.

We do not feel that a change in Agency or community compartmentation procedures in this area is necessary or desirable at this time.

/s/ John F. Blake

John F. Blake


Distribution:

Orig - addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - ER

DDA Internal:

✓1 - DDA Subj w/o/att
1 - DDA Chrono
1 - RFZ Chrono

Attachments: DDA 77-2309-Memo for DDA fm DCI dtd 25 Apr 77 re Classification
DDA 77-2426-Memo for AEO/DDA fm AD/OS dtd 29 Apr 77 re Classification



29 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Executive Officer to the DDA
STATINTL FROM: [REDACTED]
Acting Director of Security
SUBJECT: Classification
REFERENCE: Memorandum from DCI dated 25 April 1977,
same subject (ER 77-7344; DDA 77-2309)

1. Action Requested: None. This memorandum is submitted in response to your request for comments on the issue raised in reference.

2. Basic Data: There is no doubt that certain procedures associated with the handling of CODEWORD material (i.e., sensitive compartmented information) with respect to transmittal and receipting requirements are less complex than those for TOP SECRET documents without compartmented controls.

Noncompartmented TOP SECRET material, relatively speaking, represents a small percentage of the total volume of Agency classified material. The requirements for handling such material are consistent with those established by Executive Order 11652 and its implementing National Security Council Directive. Because of the relatively low volume, no significant problems exist in adhering to the letter of these requirements.

CODEWORD material, i.e., sensitive compartmented information, on the other hand represents a relatively large percentage of the total volume of Agency material and involves rapid dissemination of material to a relatively large audience. Imposition of receipting requirements as strict as those that apply for noncompartmented TOP SECRET material would seriously inhibit such rapid dissemination.

The Office of Security has no evidence whatsoever that CODEWORD designation, i.e., compartmented channels, is being used to avoid the somewhat stricter dissemination and receipting procedures of the TOP SECRET control system. Further, it would not appear to be a logical avenue, since fraudulent and unnecessary application of CODEWORD control on a document would limit its dissemination within the Agency, where all staff employees hold TOP SECRET clearances but not all are approved for compartmented access.

The appropriate regulations governing the handling of both noncompartmented TOP SECRET material and CODEWORD material, i.e., sensitive compartmented information, are regularly under review. The current requirement that each and every reader of a TOP SECRET document acknowledge by signature his access thereto is currently under review by the Agency. However, a decision on this issue as to the need for change is being examined in the light of overall TOP SECRET control system procedures and in our view should not be based on a premise which we have been unable to validate, viz., that current TOP SECRET control receipting procedures are being evaded by use of the CODEWORD control systems.

We do not feel that a change in Agency or community STATINTL compartmentation procedures in this area is necessary or desirable.



ER Check of 5/11.

DDA 77-2496 to DCI on 5/6/77.

STATINTL

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Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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